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Postdigital war beneath the sea?  
The Stack’s underwater cable insecurity 
Richard J. Aldrich & Athina Karatzogianni  
 
Abstract 
This article addresses the problem of undersea cable security, arguing that for almost a century 
undersea cables have been the playground of major states that have enjoyed the practice of cable 
interference as part of international conflict. Over the last two decades, it has been a major source of 
intelligence for organisations like NSA and GCHQ, and so there has been a reluctance to advance 
international legalisation in this area. Nonetheless, the effect of this has been a failure to protect the 
digital global commons, and as a consequence, the level of risk to critical infrastructure is growing. 
The use of cables for intelligence gathering has resulted in a legal regime that is patchy and 
piecemeal, reflecting a general conspiracy of silence amongst major states about intelligence and its 
interplay with international law, very much raising questions about the interplay of hardware and 
software sovereignty with the declining sovereignty of states in modern geopolitics defined by the 
additional problem of the emergency of the looming ecological disaster. Ultimately, we argue that 
the end of the digital, through its dependency and risk to the Earth layer, poses critical questions 
regarding emergent postdigital battlefields, right at the heart of the deep materiality of 
computation. 
 
Introduction: when will the Stack fall? 
In 2015, Benjamin Bratton published an influential book entitled The Stack. Its central proposition 
was that computing has become a global leviathan. He argued that current computing systems are 
best conceptualised as a global megastructure—the Stack. This structure is layered by six tiers: 
Earth, Cloud, City, Address, Interface, and User. Bratton’s most important claim is that The Stack is 
rendering other forms of human governance and sovereignty obsolete. Bratton’s assertions are by 
equal turns beguiling and bewildering, since they often involve convoluted rhetoric and abstraction. 
Nevertheless, Bratton’s idea of a computational megastructure is of critical importance. It underlines 
the assertion that the internet is a physical thing that is built one layer upon another—and as such is 
vulnerable. Precisely because it consists of ‘machines and material’, he suggests that it could be ‘a 
causality of its own potentially disastrous impacts’. To evidence this, he refers to a typhoon that 
broke at least nine communications cables 4000 m down in the ocean that disrupted the internet 
and telecommunications between Taiwan, China and Hong Kong, pointing to a report that ‘over 95% 
of global communications traffic is handled by just 1 million km of undersea fiber-optic cable.’ 
(Bratton 2015, 96 cites Foster, 18 August 2011). In other words, if the Stack is a layered physical-
virtual construct, then one of the questions it begs most urgently is: When will this contingent 
megastructure fail and how? 
Bratton is not the first to assert the physical nature of the internet and its connectivity with real-
world geography. In 2005, Vincent Mosco laid down a challenge to what he called the myth of 
cyberspace. In The Digital Sublime, he argued that the false prophets of the digital era had promised 
nothing less than the transformation of society. The cyber utopians assured us that with the 
computer, we could escape the constraints of the physical world, transcending time and space, and 
overturn traditional economic, social and political relationships. Mosco examined the myths 
constructed around the new digital technology and explored why they were so compelling. The 
myths of cyberspace looked curiously like the similar mythic pronouncements prompted by past 
technological advances—the telephone, the radio, and television, which in fact offered only 
incremental change not revolution or liberations. His proposition was cyberspace was not a different 
place and offered no fundamental escape from our present reality (Mosco 2005). The internet 
consists of computers, servers and above all cables—much of it remarkably unprotected. 
This article addresses precisely this problem of undersea cable security from the conceptual premise 
of the Stack. In a post-Stuxnet decade when digital war is the hot topic of the day, the widespread 
assumption is that attacks must take the form of code and consist of viruses or worms. Instead, this 
article suggests that the most vulnerable elements of the internet are actually within its Earth Layer 
of the Stack, the ‘geological substrate of computational hardware and of the geopolitics of mineral 
and resource flows of extraction, consumption, and discarding’ (Bratton 2015, 70). 
Nicole Starosielski is an archaeologist who specialises in the materiality of the internet. She observes 
that the terms used to describe important elements of the internet, such as ‘wireless and ‘cloud’, 
seem almost deliberately designed to disguise the underlying need for physical infrastructure, and as 
a result, this is only dimly appreciated. ‘Our seemingly wireless lives are predicated on a mess of 
tangled wires’ (Starosielski 2015). The cloud is an example of the use of utopian language deployed 
to market less than romantic products and this, in turn, conjures up visions of ‘other worlds’ 
(Amoore 2018). Bratton talks of the Cloud layer of the Stack as ‘vast server archipelagos behind the 
scenes and behind the surface that provide ubiquitous computational services as well as the 
geopolitical intrigue that involves them’ (Bratton 2015, 70). He includes within this ‘the entire 
infrastructural complex of server farms, massive databases, energy sources, optical cables, wireless 
transmission media, and distributed applications’ (ibid). His account focuses on the conflicts arising 
from ‘the juxtaposition and superimposition of state geography and cloud platforms’ and on how the 
‘evolution of states into cloud platforms extends and complicates the locations of infrastructural and 
legal sovereignty’ (ibid). 
In this article, we argue that for almost a century undersea cables have been the playground of 
major states that have enjoyed the practice of cable interference as part of international conflict. 
Over the last two decades, it has been a major source of intelligence for organisations like NSA and 
GCHQ, and so there has been a reluctance to advance international legalisation in this area. 
Nonetheless, the effect of this has been a failure to protect the digital global commons, and as a 
consequence, the level of risk to critical infrastructure is growing. The use of cables for intelligence 
gathering has not in itself often resulted in damage to cables, either above or below the sea. 
However, it has resulted in a legal regime that is patchy and piecemeal, reflecting a general 
conspiracy of silence amongst major states about intelligence and its interplay with international 
law, very much raising questions about the interplay of hardware and software sovereignty with the 
declining sovereignty of states in modern geopolitics defined by the additional problem of the 
emergency of the looming ecological disaster. 
This article argues that the end of the digital, through its dependency and risk to the Earth layer, 
poses critical questions regarding emergent postdigital battlefields, right at the heart of the deep 
materiality of computation. To support this argumentation, the article first explains the operational 
value of undersea cables, proceeds to situates their use in wars historically, and then discusses the 
legal and regulation problems that arise, in order to conclude with what can be done, in relation to 
the problems identified. 
 
The Stack is dependent on undersea cables 
Worries about the cloud have been voiced before. This debate has mostly focused on the security of 
the data itself, with less attention given to the sustainability of access to that data. Today, the 
world’s oceans are criss-crossed by over a million kilometres of undersea fibre-optic cable, carrying 
over 95% of the world’s communications traffic. This data consists of a mixture of voice, text, 
pictures, video and commercial data. The biggest concentration of data exchange is transatlantic. 
The world’s major financial and military systems are increasingly dependent on this data. Without it, 
the banks cannot trade and the killer drones cannot fly. How vulnerable is this infrastructural 
landscape and why is it so poorly protected? 
Perhaps the most material manifestation of the internet is its global undersea cable network. This 
physical system of fibre-optic cables joins the major countries of the world and carries over 95 per 
cent of international voice and data traffic. As late as 1988, microwave and satellites were the main 
data carriers, sending their information through air and space. In the same year, the first Atlantic 
fibre-optic cable was laid with the capacity for 50,000 simultaneous phone calls, more than ten times 
that of equivalent copper cables. The undersea communications revolution had begun. Owing to 
their vast capacity, lower cost and extended lifespan, submarine cables have now completely 
overtaken satellites as the principal means of delivering international communications (ICPC). 
Once upon a time, these undersea cables only carried Victorian telegraph messages. Now they carry 
many kinds of data—telephone calls, emails, bank account transfers, above all video around the 
world. Accessing your data from the cloud is highly convenient. Multinational companies rely on 
these cables more and more to access their files as the cloud grows, and therefore the potential 
economic impact of an interruption to these cables becomes more serious. Arguably, the growth in 
cloud storage has increased the importance of undersea cables, because our ability to access our 
essential files is crucially dependent on them. Moreover, the matter of who would be responsible for 
the economic loss associated with such a disruption is highly ambiguous (Hantover 2013, 1–9). 
Certain users have already identified this problem and have decided upon a solution. Some have 
decided to do away with the requirement for undersea cables altogether when it comes to data 
storage in the cloud. Google, one of the key providers, has allowed customers to pay extra costs to 
specify where their data is stored. The City of Los Angeles has a contract with Google, and it has 
guaranteed that the city’s data will remain within the ‘contiguous forty-eight states’ making it 
immune to ocean cable interference (ibid. 18). 
 
 
What do these undersea cables look like? 
Trevor Paglen learned scuba diving and underwater navigation, venturing to the ocean floor to 
photograph undersea cables, which top-secret documents show are tapped by the NSA (see Paglen, 
n.d.): ‘The photographs of coastlines point to the places where undersea cables connecting the 
European and American continents meet the mainland and are tapped by the NSA for the purpose of 
surveillance. Maritime maps visualise the locations of fibre-optic cables to prevent ships from 
colliding with them. The works are supplemented by NSA documents from the archives of Edward 
Snowden, corporate documents and photography of the sites (Fig. 1). 
To a remarkable degree, they resemble a garden hosepipe. Although given a protective coating of 
woven steel, they are only about four centimetres in diameter and so are relatively vulnerable. 
While they are normally buried in trenches up to a metre deep when running close to the surface, 
below 300 metres they simply run along the surface of the seabed. Burying the cables close to shore 
is achieved by subsea ploughing and more recently by water-jetting (Muneez et al. 2018). They have 
proved remarkably vulnerable to accidents—normally fishing by trawlers and ship anchors, together 
with natural disaster, such as seismic activity. Vulnerability is increased by concentration, since all 
except one of the transatlantic cables achieve landfall in the USA with the same 50-km area on the 
East Coast. It is much the same story in other parts of the world. 
The biggest peacetime threat is probably to the global financial sector. International banks probably 
process over $10 trillion each day using undersea cables almost exclusively. Serious disruption of 
these cables would halt this activity. While there are now hundreds of cables crossing the global 
seabed, for particular states, banks and markets, often dependant on a few cables, there are serious 
points of vulnerability. Moreover, because of the growth in internet traffic generated primarily by 
video for entertainment, supply is barely keeping pace with demand. Accordingly, there is not 
enough undersea communication network redundancy available to support global banking 
transactions in a crisis, nor could satellites provide enough back-up. Manufacturing supply chains are 
also vulnerable. Connectivity is responsible for an increasing portion of advanced industrial output. 
The more sophisticated commercial products now involve commodities and components sourced 
from many different countries, constituting a bewilderingly complex chain of subcontractors, 
designers and retailers. These disparate players are able to seamlessly integrate their efforts using 
the internet, enabling greater specialisation and impressive economies of scale with each stage of 
the process of assembly. This is beneficial since it has advanced economic growth in places that are 
unable to build an entire product domestically. In short, today’s global manufacturing chains and 
financial services are only made possible by transoceanic cables (Clark 2016). 
Major military operations are increasingly dependent on these cables. A significant portion of US 
Department of Defence data travelling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) video. 
In 2010, UAVs flew 190,000 h, and the Air Force estimates that it will need more than one million 
UAV hours annually to be prepared for future wars. The best way to bring down the US drone fleet, 
or indeed to undermine the Five Eyes intelligence system, which is hugely dependant on internet 
surveillance, would be to attack submarine cables (Hamilton and Kreuzer 2018). The physical 
destruction of a number of cables would slow the internet down rather than stop it. But what if this 
physical attack were combined with a Stuxnet type attack against network management systems 
used to control the cable infrastructure? Would a combination of digital hacks and the use of hack-
saws combined have the potential to kill military connectivity across entire regions for days even 
weeks? 
 
The historic lineage of cable interference 
Historic examples suggest that cable cutting is possible and that the effects are serious. Cable cutting 
has an honourable lineage. The beginning of the First World War was marked by a British effort to 
send out specialist cable ships determined with to disrupt German undersea telegraph cables. Early 
on 5 August 1914, only a few hours after war was declared, Britain carried out an operation that 
seemed to be minor, but was actually vital. A British cable ship severed five German overseas 
underwater cables, which passed from Emden through the English Channel to Vigo, Tenerife, the 
Azores and the USA. Germany was left with access to only one cable and any message sent through 
this could be read by Britain. In revenge, Germany sought to destroy British telegraph cables in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans, attacking stations at Fanning Island and the Cocos Islands in late 1914. On 
3 September 1939, shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Allies once more cut the 
German cables from Emden to New York via the Azores and from Emden to Lisbon. Similar cable 
cutting operations marked the start to the Korean War and even the Gulf War in 1991. These early 
‘cable wars’ underlined the strategic importance of the global telegraph network (Rankin 2008; Aid 
2009). 
The Cold War was more about cable interference than cutting. During the 1970s, the US Navy 
converted the nuclear-powered submarine USS Halibut into a dedicated espionage platform that 
intruded into Soviet waters with a team of highly trained saturation deep divers. Their task was to 
introduce recording devices onto Soviet submarine cables in Shelikhova Bay, at the northern point of 
the Sea of Okhotsk, which could listen in without physically violating or disturbing the cable. The 
programme was given the codename “Operation Ivy Bells,” and allowed the USA to listen to the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet base near Vladivostok. This was not an isolated case and 10 years later, the NSA 
was fighting the US press to prevent it being written about, because although the Soviets had blown 
this particular operation, it was being used against other countries (Bradlee 1996). 
It is likely that this process of intelligence exploitation explains why major states have fought shy of 
protecting cables under international law. In June 2013, the Snowden revelations illuminated the 
way in which submarine cables have become even more important in cyber-espionage and 
intelligence gathering. The initial advance of fibre-optic cables seemed to offer some protection 
against eavesdropping, since they were technically hard to tap into. But once this problem was 
overcome, they provided an intelligence bonanza. Both the main intelligence techniques used by the 
NSA and GCHQ codenamed “Tempora” and “Prism” ultimately depend on cable tapping. Tempora 
was a cable access technique and Prism was system of backdoor access to servers—but also 
dependent on tapping into cables between data centres (Davenport 2015). 
However, serious problems can be caused by events much less dramatic than war. Currently, the 
majority of cable faults arise from trawl fishing and anchoring, but because these tend to be local 
events, they represent a routine nuisance rather than a strategic hazard to major countries. Some 
small countries are dependent in some cases on one cable and can be cut off by one person wielding 
a hoe or a shovel. In 2011, a peasant farmer in Georgia halted most of the internet traffic in Armenia 
when she unearthed two of its three fibre-optic lines while searching for scrap metal (Starosielski 
2015). Natural disasters, primarily related to seismic activity are much less frequently but can cause 
widespread disruption with significant economic effects. In 2006, an earthquake off the southern 
coast of Taiwan resulted in undersea landslides that severed nine undersea cables. As a result, 
communications with China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam were badly affected 
for a period of 3 months, since satellites were unable to carry more than a percentage of the traffic. 
This halted trading on the Hong Kong stock exchange and also stopped currency trading in South 
Korea. For a period of days much of the internet communication in this region was dependent on 
one remaining cable. A complex operation using a fleet of eleven ships was required to carry out the 
repair work (Sechrist 2010). 
The matter of deliberate disruption remains mysterious. During 2008, multiple undersea cables that 
connected Egypt and Dubai were severed. Two cable breaks were at opposite ends of the 
Mediterranean, one close to Alexandria, and the other not far from Marseille. The third incident was 
off the coast of Dubai and the fourth was on a cable connecting the United Arab Emirates to Qatar. 
About 70% of the international communications between Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and 
Indian subcontinent were carried by these cables and so about 80% of India’s international 
connectivity was lost. The Maldives lost practically all its communications capability. The debate 
continues as to whether this was a series of storms or sabotage, but divers were arrested off the 
coast of Egypt. In 2013, three divers with hand tools cut the main cable connecting Egypt with 
Europe, reducing Egypt’s internet bandwidth by 60% (Timmons 2008). 
 
Cable cutting and the law of the sea 
Given the importance of undersea cables, they are poorly protected by international law. They 
represent perhaps the most extreme example of states privatising critical infrastructure but failing to 
extend protection. At present international law, mostly consisting of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, does little to secure undersea cables or indeed cables where they 
emerge from the sea onto land. States have much less power to address miscreants than say in the 
realm of piracy and even have uncertain rights when boarding suspect vessels. One suspects this 
reflects the fact that historically, major powers have seen it as an advantage to attack the cables of 
minor powers in war (Sunak 2017). 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which most states are signatories, is 
perhaps the most important sea treaty of the last 100 years. This law does not prevent states from 
regarding undersea cables as military targets during wartime. Although it requires states to 
implement national laws that criminalise the breaking of undersea cables by vessels bearing their 
flag, this has been ignored by the convention’s signatories or gestured to with only a low fine. 
Typically, the US federal law for submarine cable protection offers a maximum penalty of just $5000 
for wilful injury to cables. Predictably, perhaps, in the light of what we have learned about the 
activities of organisations like NSA, the USA helped draft and signed the treaty, but has not ratified 
it, and so is not bound by it. There is no attempt to create an international crime, in which all states 
have jurisdiction over the offender, indeed warships do not appear to have the right to board a 
vessel suspected of interfering with undersea cables in international waters (Sunak 2017). 
The present system delegates too much activity to nation-states. Enforcement at a local level is 
simply too patchy and a better mechanism would be to regard attacks on cables as akin to terrorism 
or piracy which would allow universal jurisdiction. This would have the advantage of avoiding any 
jurisdictional entanglements and would allow any country to take action, even those not directly 
affected by the incident. This change would not be straightforward, since the laws of piracy focus on 
private gain by seizing ‘vessels’. However, the recent history of states stretching terrorist legislation 
to cover other criminal actions suggests that this would not be too difficult to achieve, if states 
genuinely wished to do this (Wrathall 2010, 246–248; Matis 2012). 
British and American defence chiefs have warned loudly about the danger of Russia interfering with 
cables, reflecting recent anxiety over Moscow’s campaign of unconventional or hybrid means of 
warfare. Certainly, in the Crimea, Russia quickly severed all digital communications from the 
peninsula, and it has been reconnoitring undersea cables in the Atlantic using submarines (Sunak 
2017). Fear of Russian cable cutting has a long history. The UK government recently declassified a 
1959 report about British intelligence fears about a Soviet attack on Allied communications by 
cutting cables across the Atlantic that carried much of the traffic between GCHQ and NSA. Most of 
the data used by the world’s Signals Intelligence Leviathan is still carried by these cables (Goodman 
and Dylan 2016). 
 
Other commentaries are less anxious about Moscow. They argue that because faults occur quite 
frequently, cable repair ships would deal with minor incidents quite quickly. Some argue that Russia 
enjoys integral continental communications, and so would enjoy seeing global communications 
disrupted, but others suggest that much Russian content, and money, is actually stored abroad. 
While the most important cable traffic is transatlantic, there is also more redundancy here and 
ultimately some of this traffic could be routed across the Pacific. 
The biggest dangers are for smaller countries. The highest risk is for those places with limited 
infrastructures, such as Africa, and some parts of Southeast Asia. An attack here could mean real 
internet disruption, partly because of the way in which services have developed in these countries. 
They are often more dependent on the internet for certain services, including banking, than western 
countries. Other countries simply represent key nodal points in the network. For example, if Egypt’s 
undersea cables were destroyed, at least one-third of the global internet could be impacted 
(Starosielski 2015). Fortaleza, a city in northern Brazil that few have heard of, is one of the undersea 
cable capitals of the world connecting much of North and South America. If this was attacked it 
would interrupt much of the data flowing across the Western hemisphere (Matsakis 2018). 
One suspects that cables are poorly protected by law because major states have historically wished 
to preserve the privilege of cable cutting for themselves. Like strategic airpower or nuclear 
submarines, there has been a high-cost entry barrier to deep ocean activity. Only major navies or 
advanced research organisations have possessed the technology to operate in such an environment. 
However, this is changing because of the emergence of undersea drones. Many enemies, either 
state or non-state could employ a modified commercial robot vehicle combined with explosives to 
attack undersea infrastructure. The biggest threat comes from Unmanned Undersea Vehicles or 
UUVs. Just as drones are posing a puzzling security problem on land, so their undersea equivalent is 
likely to present challenges (Wrathall 2010, 237). 
Mending an undersea cable at sea is time-consuming and difficult. Most new cables have integral 
monitoring systems that give some indication as to the sector where the break has occurred. 
Thereafter, maintenance vessels trace to that location and haul up the cable until they reach the 
affected point. Fresh cable then has to be introduced and this is something that can take several 
days. Onshore arrival points are also vulnerable, and are rather isolated and unprotected. Often a 
small building on cliff top or beach, these are frequently the arrival point of several cables. While 
repair would be simple on land, these sites offer the possibility of cutting several cables at once. 
 
Conclusion: what can be done 
‘Going forward, there is no Earth layer without the Cloud layer, and vice versa’ (Bratton 2015, 140). 
Despite the Cloud layer’s governance of the Earth layer, through the fluid boundaries of cloud 
jurisdiction, single states or binaries can still do quite a lot. Some have suggested information 
storage legislation that would require corporations and local governments to maintain separate and 
redundant information in a way that ensures restore regular functionality. Certified data storage 
providers would charge more but would offer highly redundant systems to access their data with 
more local storage. This would mirror ideas of a splinternet already emerging in other contexts. It 
would also make sense to construct hidden additional cables to build resilience, but admittedly this 
would be expensive. The Southern Cross Cable, for instance, which connects Australia, New Zealand, 
Hawaii, and the continental USA, costs more than $1.5 billion (Sunak 2017, 16). 
However, as Robert Martinage has suggested, fundamentally this is a problem of global governance, 
since it is about the vulnerability of the commons (2015). Many of the remedies advanced by 
commentators focus on national resilience and local infrastructure. Certainly, countries should 
follow the Australian example and designate a single national point of contact for undersea cable 
protection, rather than having it spread across many ministries, as is often the case at present. 
Alliances like NATO and regional organisations like the Organisation of American States need to work 
with the major companies to develop better cable-protection strategies, typically involving smart 
sensors. Commander Michael Matis of the US Navy recommends creating a new international cable 
construction monitoring regime that would copy current maritime tariff trading technology to 
promote greater international cooperation and information sharing (Matis 2012). Ultimately, this 
problem is international, since a cable break off the coast of Egypt could impact India significantly. In 
the long term, any viable security strategy must be global in scope. There are a range of 
international associations in this area including International Cable Protection Committee, and 
regional bodies like the North American Submarine Cable Association (NASCA), but there is a lack of 
a central monitoring authority that works with appropriate ministries around the world (Hantover 
2013, 18). 
Global telecom companies would like to see the USA ratify the 1982 Law of the Sea, since within that 
jurisdiction, they are currently reliant on customary international law and statues dating back to 
1884. Telecom and energy companies desire greater government support in enforcing property 
rights and undersea infrastructure security outside of territorial seas. This might take the form of a 
proclamation that declares the sovereignty of all undersea infrastructure, which is US owned or 
services US consumers, and provides for a retaliatory response if it is besieged. President Truman’s 
proclamation on the Continental Shelf represents a viable precedent (Wrathall 2010, 249). The most 
sensible option would be to extend international legislation dealing with pirates or terrorism, two 
areas where we have seen effective international action. Because critical infrastructure under the 
sea is often well beyond national jurisdiction, falling it within the law of the Sea that protects other 
ocean platforms against piracy would make sense (ibid. 256). International law has also made 
advances in areas like action against terrorism financing and this might also offer a model (Brennan 
2018). 
Perhaps it is worth pondering why the structural vulnerability of undersea cables remains 
unaddressed, despite a decade of panic about the resilience of critical infrastructure. Equally 
puzzling, states worry about digital cyberattacks on electrical grids, but do not devote attention to 
protecting the Internet from physical attacks. Why is this? Perhaps it is because for a 100 years 
states that have had an attack mentality must now take action to protect the physical structure of 
the internet. Yet for organisations like the NSA, focusing on defence, rather than attack, is not in 
their nature. In that regard, as Bratton (2015, 140) observes, things are likely to change because of 
the emergent threat of ecological disaster: He argues: ‘as the geopolitics of climate change—related 
energy production and consumption effects loom larger, the questions of energy provision, 
dissemination, transparency, monitoring, alliance, and allegiance will […] drive realignments of 
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